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THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION:

POWER IN TRANSITION

I am delighted to find myself delivering the benediction
at these proceedings.

It is an uncommon experience.

The last

word is something that is rarely reserved for the Leadership in
a Senate of unlimited

debate~

Notwithstanding this built-in propensity for talk,
however, the Senate has acted with unusual dispatch during the
past few weeks.

While this symposium has

ponde~ed

the dilemmas

of power, the Senate has sought to resolve several of them.
With regard to Viet Nam, for example, the Senate
vcted first to

esta~lish

a national policy cf full withdrawal
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within six months.

Later, at the insistence of the House, which

had an assist from the Administration, the specific time span
was removed and full withdrawal was accepted only as a Congressional rather than a national policy.

Still later, in other

legislation, and with the reluctant concurrence of the House
and the Administration, the Senate's insistence on full withdrawal from Viet Nam was established as national policy but
still without a specific withdrawal dateo

Finally, in a foreign

aid bill, the Senate is making one more effort to restate its
pristine and more emphatic position on Viet Nam, that is, full
withdrawal within six months.
In similar tugs and starts and stops , the Senate voted
to cut, then to increase parts of

fo~eign aid~

then to reject it

in toto, only to resuscita te most of the Administration;s aid
program in two bills a short time later, underscoring the fact
"Ghat foreign aid is a prcgram with more lives than a cat.

•
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Contrary to the appea=ances, these actions are more
than marches up the hill and down.

They are not empty gestures.

They say what the people of thenation are saying.

In language

which is audible in the other Branches they say that the Senate
wants the war in Viet Nam to end completely and soon.

They say,

too, that the Senate is growing insistent on a sweeping revision
and scale-down of foreign aid.
The apparent indecisiveness of the actions arises,
in part, from the fact that there are other centers of federal
power--in the House and in the Presidency--wherein other ideas
are held and with which the Senate must come to terms.
also a reflection of a kind of dilEmma of power:

It is

it is sympto-

matic of the uncertainty of the Congress in confronting the
salient factor of the contemporary international situation.
I am sure this symposium has long since identified
that factor.
globe.

It is the surge of change which is sweeping the

F=om the rimlands of Asia to the western littoral of

- 4 Europe international relationships of a generation are giving
way; just as currencies, fixed in value for decades, are now
floating, so too are old alliances and alignments.
In this nation, a new outlook is readily detectable.
It is present especially in the young who are not bound by the
fixations of the past but it is by no means confined to the
young.

The international experiences of the past few years

have shocked the thought patterns of the entire nation.
In the United States, the time for a change in foreign
policy is ripe.

If this situation finds a counterpart in the

Soviet Union_, then we may well be on the threshhold of the
liquidation of the dubious heritage of the cold war.

Ironically,

the era of cold war is ending not in the "positions of strength,"
which at one time were regarded in U. S. policy as an essential
of peace; indeed, the Secretary of Defense has even raised
doubts about the present capacity of our defenses.

Nor is the

cold wa.r clostllg jn drastic changes in the state systems of

•

- 5 Eastern Europe, or the West, which, once in the eyes of more
militant ideologists in both countries, were held to be the
only basis for its ending.
Rather, the heat has been taken out of the cold war,
if I may mix the

temperatures~

by degrees.

Old conflicts have

dissolved slowly in symposia such as the one which is taking
place here, to which I allude as symbolic of t he growth of
peaceful interchange between the two systems.
The old conflicts are also diluted by the emergence
of other international considerations which have pressed into
the purview of the two nations.

China, for example, now looms

lar ge in the concerns of the Soviet Union.

At the same time,

the United States is immersed in the practical and urgent tzreata
to the economy, more or less to the exclusion of the theoretical
a nd distant menaces of alien ideologies.
Irond.cally, thi s transition comes at a time when the
affairs of the nation are presided over by a Republican

- 6 Administration which was once in the front ranks of what was
termed the "battle for the minds of men."

May I say that the

irony is all to the credit of the incumbent political leaderGhip.

The President has been able to set aside the things of

the past.

In the light of present realities, he is acting to

remove some of the barnacles which encrust the foreign policy
of the United States.
Without detracting from the Administration's achievement in any way, I think it is fair to note that the times have
been over-ripe for this change.

I like to think, too, that the

lc:vel of reason is such in this nation that the transition might
have come under any perceptive administration of whatever partisan stripe.
expectation.

But, perhaps, that is an excessively sanguine
In any event, there is little question of the

general effectiveness of the incumbent Administration.

It is

an effectiveness which tends to support Walter Lippmann's thesis
that liberal change is best brought about by conservative
government.

•

- 7 The critical element in the Administration's new
approach to international policies, it seems to me, is the
Nixon Doctrine which was unveiled in Guam in 1969.

That Doctrine

set the stage for a diminution of the role which the United
States has played across the spectrum of world affairs for 25
years.

In so doing, it elevated a concept of policy much arti--

culated but little practiced since World War II--that of shared
responsibility for the maintenance of world peace.

The changes

which have been wrought by the Doctrine are already evident not
only in Southeast Asia but elsewhere around the globe, as bases
are closed and

u.

S. military forces abroad are reduced.

In some quarters, there is a tendency to see in this
process of military contraction some sort of shameful furling
of the flag.

Rather, tre change ia sensible and long overdue.

It acts to reduce the too heavy burdens which have been carried
for too long by the people of the nation often in the vague
name of "international commitment."

Moreover, if the fla g has

•

- 8 been placed by a mistaken policy in places where it does not
belong--as in Indochina--its withdrawal under the Nixon Doctrine
is not only an essential act in our vital national interests, it
is also the only honorable course.

Indeed, if the Doctrine is

to have historic significance in my judgment, it will bring about
not a partial but a complete termination of

u.

S. military involv e-

ment in Southeast Asia ; that means everywhere on the mainland,
be it in Viet Nam, Cambodia, Laos, or Thailand and by land, sea
and air.

The Doctrine will also provide, if it is to have historic

significance, the rationale for a continuing reduction in our
one-sided military effort s els ewhere in the world, notably, in
\vestern Europe under NATO .
Notwithstandi n g the diminut i on of the U. S. milit a ry
pr esence abroad, the Unit ed States i s not about to disappea r
from the international sc ene .

This nation 's wei ght is immens e

and it will continue to be felt i n many wa ys and ln many places.
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That is as desirable as it is inevitable.

Indeed, a sensitive

concern with affairs beyond our borders remains an essential of
the world's civilized survival.

That such is the case argues

strongly for a most judicious use of our resources abroad.

There

is no longer a surplus to be expended in haphazard, almost indiscriminate fashion, for fear that the label of isolation may
otherwise be pinned on our policies.
It is reassuring, therefore, that along with the
military contraction, the omnipresence of U. S. economic aid
is also in the process of receding around the globe.

In this

scale-down which affects largely the bilateral programs of aid,
the Senate has played and will continue to play an important
part.

It is to be anticipated that pressure from the Senate

further
will bring about/changes in the basic design of the program.
The fact is that the present system has lost much of
the charisma which was imparted to it by the Marshall

Plan~

Point-Four program and the Peace Corps of another time.

the

Foreign

•
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aid has become, in recent years, a lavish grab-bag, an international pork barrel, and a world wide arms distribution.

As

presently constituted, the program is an economic drain on the
nation.

More seriously, it has led the United States via the

path of a well-meaning humanitarian generosity into

unwarranted

political and military involvements in the inner affairs of other
peoples .
It may be that foreign aid can be recast into its
earlier form of people-to-people cooperation.

As it involves

economic development, the program has already moved in large
part out of bilateral channels and into multilateral agencies.
That is a welcomed change.

It has the virtue of permitting the

burdens of cost to be shared with other nations.

At the same

time, it insulates this nation from adventures in unilateral
internationalism which can lead, as we have seen in Indochina,
into tragic entanglements.

- 11 -

Underlying the new direction in U. S. policies, I
believe, is a growing tendency to view this nation's interests
less in the context of ideological generalities and more in
terms of national well-being and survival.

Viet Nam has alerted

the people to the consequences of a blind pursuit of ideological
obsessions.

The dollar crisis and the dangerous sidetracking

of the nation's inner needs by the demands of the involvement
in Southeast Asia have revealed what lies at the end of the
road of indiscriminate internationalism.

Henceforth, it is

to be expected that the United States will exercise

greate~

discretion in choosing grounds on which to defend a more
narrowly construed concept of this nation's responsibilities
and interests in the world.
It is essential that the implications of the new

u. s.

approach be considered most carefully by the other

nation whose dilemmas of power are juxtaposed against our
own in this symposium.

Indeed, the risks of confrontation
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between the United States and the Soviet Union
may even be increased temporarily by the presant contracting
of the U. S. position.

That would be the case if the contrac-

tion led to probings of the new limits of our interests abroad.
If such probings were to occur, they could very well strike
close to the vital considerations of civilized survival.
The effect of a number of other shifts in the balances
of world power must also be considered in this time of

transiti o~.

The world is moving away from a bipartite determinism of international politics.

Major questions of war and peace may no

longer rest overwhelmingly in the province of the Soviet Union
and the United States.

Now China is emerging as a major power.

So, too, at least in economic terms, is the European Community
and Japan.
With more major nations on the scene, more difference8
to settle and perhaps, more sources of military and nuclear
power to

manipulate~

the problems of peace grow more complex.

- 13 We may find that the risk of conflict increases in proportion
to the rising number of contenders and the broader the diffusion
of international power.
Hopefully, these unhappy possibilities will not come
to pass.

They need not if the dilution of the roles of the

United States and the Soviet Union is accompanied by greater
understanding and restraint between these two nations and timely
adjustment of relationships with third nations.

The United

States and the Soviet Union are in a unique position at this
point in history.

They are emerging from a protracted

pe~iod

of mutual antagonism, without having come to a direct military
confrontation.

There is little doubt that t he combined strengtll

of the two nations, in harmony, could assu..:·e to them a subste.r: ·
tial share in shaping the conditions of peace.

By the same

token, in disharmony, tha t strength can lead to the ultimate
disaster of nuclear war or, at the least, it could condemn t he
possibilities of establishing a

d~rable

peace for decades t o

- 14 I do not think that this new situation and the opportunities presented for negotiation have been lost on the Nixon
Administration.

The President, as you know, is pursuing a

policy of rapprochement with the Soviet Union.

He is proceed-

ing on the assumption that many of the differences between the
two governments can now be accommodated and that the interest
of neither is served by continuing conflict.
In this process, the highest priority should continue
to rest on the negotiations with regard to disarmament.

The

SALT talks have been described by the President as "the m0st
important arms control negotiations this country has ever
entered."

Their success could provide an inestimable contri-

bution to international stability.

By the same token, however.

their failure could signal a resumption of the nuclear armd
race at a point of great risk.
The initial indications reveal at least a mutual
understanding of viewpoints and a mutual eagerness to moye

•
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The Soviet concern is already delineated

as seeking to forestall the U, S. deployment of defensive
weapons, that is the anti-ballistics missiles, and to enlarge
the talks to include U,

s.

nuclear weapons which are deployed

at forward bases in Europe and elsewhere within relatively
short-range of Eastern Europe.

u.

On the other hand, the prime

S. concern, it is clear, is the desire to limit Soviet

offensive missiles and to maintain our alliances in Europe
and the Far East.
Each of the two government s have acknowledgedthe
priorities of the other.

At least that is a beginning, in

which the cards have been placed on the table.

The candor is

refreshing and provides, in my judgment, some modest basis for
hope to the arms-burdened people of both nations.

In the mont hs

ahead the negotiators will be preoccupied with complex que8tion2
involving the mathematics of limitation.

In what way must the

United States curb its deployment of ABM's and by how much if

..
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At What point should there be a

ceiling on offensive Soviet ICBM's or on Soviet missile carrying submarines in order to achieve an agreement?
If the negotiators find answers to questions of this
kind and an agreement is reached, the Senate will be well prepared to act on its responsibilities with regard to ratificati on.
Even now, the talks are being watched with special interest in
the Senate.

Just a few weeks ago, I visited the U. S. Ambassador

to the SALT talks who was at that time in Helsinki and, I must
say, was reassured by his optimism.
Beyond disarmament, it seems to me that the two mos ·c
complex issues which will confront the Soviet Union and the
United States during this period of transition involve the
relationships with inner Europe, east and west, and with C'!: i nr. _
With respect to China, it seems to me that the President has
taken a highly significant initiative in his decision to go t o
Peking.

The visit should not be expected to achieve much in

•
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the way of substance.

After a lapse of contact for almost a

quarter of a century, however, the very act of going should
open new prospects for buildir.g a stable peace in the Western
Pacific.

If these prospects are to materialize, clearly they

cannot be pursued by the United States in China oblivious to
the concerns of the Soviet Union or Japan.

It would be danger-

ous in the extreme if the path to Peking were to bypass either
Moscow or Tokyo.
In my judgment, a durable pattern of international
stability in East Asia depends upon relations of comity aillong
all four principal powers.

I am delighted, therefore, that by

the Treaty of Okinawan Reversion, as well as in his brief meeting in Alaska with the Emperor of Japan, the President has
acted to protect--so to speak--one flank of his peregrination
to the Chinese capital.

At the same time, his announced visit

to Moscow should safeguard the other, especially when it is
coupled with the public assurances which he has given that a

...
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rapprochement between China and the United States is in no way
designed to exacerbate Sino-Soviet difficulties.
It may be that the round of personal contact by
President Nixon will lead subsequently to more tangible result ':.
than meetings of this kind in the past.
remembers Glassboro?

Who, now, for example:

And what was achieved there?

A natural follow-through of the President's

visit~~

it seems to me, might well be quadrapartite talks on the
maintenance of peace--a peace of the Pacif ic .

In considering

this question tlbere is a need for a frank confrontation of tL:
four major nations--Japan, the Soviet Union, China and the
U"nited States--whose power converges in the Western Pacific.
There is also need for greate:r contact on this question betY\e t:. ..·•
them and the smaller countries of the region.

The

r_; lai~ itJ

of

direct contact can contribu·ce, I believe, to the stc..bility or'
a situation in which the nuclear power of three nations alreacj·
converges and where the technical capacity exists to add

~
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Indeed, it would seem that Japan,

alone having chosen to eschew nuclear weapons, might well
take the initiative in calling such a conference.

A quadra-

partite conference might well be designed in the first instance
to seek to bring nuclear dangers--whether in testing or in
potential conflict--under rational control in the Western
Pacific.
With regard to Europe, negotiations underway and
agreements already achieved appear to be leading to a mare
stable situation.

That progress provides further

ration~le

for the reduction of the military deployments of both the
Soviet Union and the United States.

The circumstances are

tPEre, I believe, for a new thrust for peace in Europe.

The

present Administration has shown a greater responsiveness to
these circumstances than has heretofore been the case .

For

its part, I believe the Soviet Union has given evidence of a
new flexibility in responding affirmatively to the

''ea~tern
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policies 11 of Chancellor Willy Brandt.

I refer in particular

to the non-aggression pact which the Soviet Union and West
Germany have already initialed and a similar t r eaty with
Poland wherein West Germany has explicitly accepted the OderNeisse boundary.

Finally, it should be noted that the Sovie t

Union has provided, in a four-power agreement, with France,
the United Kingdom and the United States, official acknowle dge ment of the present status of West Berlin and its ties to
West Germany .
In the light of these agreements as well as the
hopeful emanations from the SALT talks, there is a timely
opportunity for negotiating

mutual and balanced reduct ions

of forces between the NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries.
Such reductions might well be over and abov e what I have
long since believed can be a unilateral draw-down of 50%
in U. S. force levels in Europe.

May I s ay that I do n bt
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regard the present level of U. S. forces in Europe in any
sense as a 'bargaining chip"in negotiating a mutual reduction
of forces withll the Soviet Union.
~ower

There is no bargaining

in the irrelevant ; an excessive and antiquated U. S.

deployment in Europe, and the enormous costs which it entails
cannot strengthen the U.

s.

position in negotiations.

It can

only weaken further the international economic position of
this nation.
Whether the Soviet Union reciprocates or not, ther efore, I believe the United States would be well-advised to
make a substantial reduction of its military deployment in
Western Europe.

Indeed, a unilateral initiative in this

connection may even act as a spur to mutual agreement.

I

do not think the Soviet Union will find it practicable to
keep inflated forces in Eattern Europe when there are not
inflated U. S. force l evels in Western Europe .

I am remindec'

again of Dwight D. Eisenhower's conclusion that one division
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of U.

s.

forces in Europe would suffice for the purposes of

the North Atlantic Treaty.
dozen

That conclusion was set fort h a

years ago by the first NATO Commander but has

been studiously ignored by successive administrations ever
since.
Looking beyond prospective developments in arms
control and the political and military stabilization of Europe,
it seems to me that a major objective of our relationship wit h
the Soviet Union should be a substantial increase in economic
interchange.

This nati 0n 1 s trade with the Soviet Union and

the entire Eastern bloc has been held in chec k for many y ea rs
by rusty barriers designed to prevent the shipment of so- ca.Jled

strategic items to Communist countries.
The present Administration has moved to facilit atE
·che growth of trade in non-strategic goods with Ea stern

Nevertheless, the volume of

u.

:remains slender by any measure .
oy 30 percent

j

~~r op e .

S. tra de with the bloc countries
Even tho1;6h this trade ros e

n l970 over the pr e tious year, t he total vo::!..ume
1

- 23 now amounts to only seven-tenths of one percent of U. S.
trade with all countries.
Until the advent of the present Administration,

th~

United States government had been most reluctant to spur
commercial relationships with Eastern Europe.

By contrast,

the Western Europeans have pursued these tieP with great vigor
for a number of years.

In 1969, their combined trade with

Eastern Europe was 15 times that of the United States in
dollar volume.
The potential of East-West trade could be more
realized by U. S. business if certain steps were to be
at once.

fu~ly

take ~

One would be the restoration of equal treatment to

Soviet export commodities and a bill to accomplish this is
now pending in Congress .

Another would be to revise the liJt

of strategic items to permit American business to sell goods
in Eastern Europe which are now freely offered there by other
Nestern nations.

Still another would be to broaden the

- 24 executive waiver power by which prohibitions can be lifted
on financing sales to Eastern European nations through the
Export-Import Bank.

None of these things will necessarily

result in a dramatic upsurge in trade but they might lead
to increasing economic contacts.

Over the long run, that

could do much to strengthen the stability of the Soviet-

u. s.

relationship.
Following closely on the heels of trade; is the

whole matter of cultural int erchange which has so much to do
with the perc eptions that the two nations have of each other.
Hopefully, if the people of the United State s and the Soviet
Union educate enou gh of each other's stud ents, listen to
enough of each other's musicians, watch each other's athletes
~ ompe te,

hold a sufficient number of symposia and so on

through a wide range of activities, they might come to an
in0.reas ed 1u1derstand j ng and appr ec jatjon with consequent
reduction in the possibility of conflict.

That is the premis e

on which our cultur a l exc hanc;e pro grr.1ns i s b.J.sed.

It seems t o

- 25 me to be a sound premise.

Unfortunately, the present progr ·:m

with the Soviet Union has fallen on hard times for a variety ot
reasons, not the least of which have been acts of harassment by
militant groups in this nation.
The Soviet Union and the United States have come a
long 'Vmy from the days of the Berlin Blockade, the Hungaria::1
uprising, the Cuban missile crisis, and the bombastic encounters
of the 1950's and early 1960's.

W'e stand now at the threshhc ld

of a new era in which many of the suspicions and antagonisms of
the past can be set aside.

President Nixon has an opportuni c~r

to consolidate this progress, indeed, thi s progress to which b-'_s
Administration has so greatly contributed.
It is a moment of historic opportunity--not in ·cenLs
of national ga.in or politlcal profit--but in the opportur..ity
·which is offered to increase the probability of the
vival of modern civilization.

decen~

sur~

If there is any las'l,ing conclugion

-co VJhich this symposium has led, : : : trust it is that we--both
na~ ions--t he

to

.:,-:;~

':.'.e

th::..~

Soviet Union
oppo~~-cu.~li

ty.

~nd

the

~nlte~

States should n o0

f~i l

